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Abstract—This paper describes two denial of service attacks against the Z-Wave protocol and their effects on smart home gateways.
Both utilize modified unencrypted packets, which are used in the inclusion phase and during normal operation. These are the
commands Nonce Get /S2 Nonce Get and Find Nodes In Range. This paper shows how both can be manipulated and used to block a
Z-Wave gateway’s communication processing which in turn disables the whole Z-Wave network connected to it.
Index Terms—Denial of Service, security, smart home, Z-Wave
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1 INTRODUCTION
W ITH the current trend towards industrial and pri-vate digitization, the building automation- and smart
home sector have become fast growing industries, since the
demand for such digitization has seen a steady increase
in the last years [1]. As these smart home systems are
becoming more commonly used, the internal and external
security of such systems is getting more and more crucial.
For this reason this paper shows an analysis of the Z-Wave
smart home protocol and its implementation in regards to
its security. Z-Wave is a proprietary standard, which today
is owned by Silicon Labs with the former owners being
Zen-Sys and Sigma Designs. While most of the protocol
standard, especially the security aspects, are being kept
secret, previous works e.g. [2] have shown, that the ”security
through obscurity” approach is ultimately doomed to fail.
While Silicon Labs customers need to implement both the
provided hardware, a Z-Wave SoC (System on Chip, [3])
or module [4] and the proprietary software protocol stack
library and are also legally bound to a nondisclosure and
confidentiality agreement regarding the secret details of
the protocol, to keep the standard secure, programmers
as well as attackers have shown that the protocol can be
reversed engineered anyway, which lead to projects like the
Open Z-Wave library [5]. With more than 2600 different Z-
Wave certified products currently available, which are being
manufactured by approx. 700 different companies and a U.S.
market share in the home security area of approx. 90% [6],
the protocol is besides Zigbee the most commonly used one
for home automation, which makes it interesting for but not
only security researchers.
The following analysis focus laid on finding security
vulnerabilities, which could be exploited using Software
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Defined Radio (SDR) to send fake messages. A HackRF One
[7] acted as transmitter and receiver, which was controlled
by GNU Radio [8]. The Python module Scapy-radio [9] was
included into attack scripts for decoding and encoding pack-
ages with the goal of finding unencrypted messages. These
messages are part of the protocol’s design and therefore
intended, but have the potential to be misused to cause
unwanted system states or to control devices. The result of
this research are two novel Denial of Service attacks (DoS),
which overload the Z-Wave gateway with relatively little
effort. A gateway in this state will no longer process events
from connected devices or the smartphone app, which dis-
ables the entire smart home network for all participants.
2 STATE OF THE ART
Previous researchers like e.g. PenTestPartners [10] discovered
a downgrade attack against the newer version of the Z-Wave
security standard. They did this within a test case using
a locked door in inclusion mode while manipulating the
NodeInfo package and exploiting its backwards compatibil-
ity. Before this attack, a security evaluation from Behrang
Fouladi and Sahand Ghanoun [11] focused on controlling a
door lock without exploiting the default key of Z-Wave de-
vices, by exploiting a missing validation in the key exchange
protocol handler. They were able to reset the shared network
key, which was ultimately a implementation error of the
door lock manufacturer. Since the implementer is capable
to fit a Z-Wave system to his needs, the protocol security
measures can be circumvented if implemented the wrong
way. Another class of attacks target the Z-Wave routing
protocol, e.g. so called Black Hole attacks [12], utilizing bad
design in the routing protocol. While most of the other pub-
lications focus on decrypting messages and/or controlling
the Z-wave components itself, we focused our evaluation
on possible denial of service attacks like the ones shown
in [12]. The novel approach of our attack thereby lays in
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2targeting the Z-Wave gateway itself and therefore the main
communication hub, not the routing devices of the Z-Wave
network.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 3 the pack-
ages used for the attacks are explained with their intended
use. Section 4 explains the methods and the procedure of
the attacks including the structure of the used packages. In
Section 5 the results of the attacks are depicted which are
then discussed in Section 6.
3 THE Z-WAVE PROTOCOL
The information about the Z-Wave protocol were gathered
through the various specifications of Silicon Labs which
are available in the internet and through testing. Z-Wave
is still a closed protocol which added to the difficulty of the
research. [13]
3.1 Nonce-Get
The Nonce-Get command is used to request a unique random
number, which must never be used again. Such number
is called Nonce which is a abbreviation for Number used
once. These nonces get requested as part of the encryp-
tion algorithm S0 Encapsulated Messages (see figure 1). The
initialization vector (IV) used for such encryption is spilt
into two parts, namely the Nonce of A and B, which are
concatenated to create the IV (IV = (nonce sender || nonce
receiver)) [14]. The Sender, here Node A, initially transmits
a Nonce Get command, which will be answered by the
receiver, Node B, with an Nonce Report package, containing
the newly created Nonce from Node B. Node A is now able
to combine both nonces as IV for the encryption of the S0
Encapsulated Message payload.
Fig. 1. Z-Wave-Transport-Encapsulation [15]
This algorithm stays basically the same for the S2 Encapsu-
lated Message except for the Nonce Get command which is
S2 Nonce Get. A connected node has to answer this request
whenever another node or the gateway sends this com-
mand, but it must not, if the command is sent by multicast.
The node itself isn’t allowed to send it via multicast either.
It should also be mentioned that, if no acknowledgement
(ACK) follows as reaction, an attempt is made to route it
to the receiver. But there is no rule in place stopping nodes
from attempts to send a) Nonce Report packets to addresses
which haven’t been assigned to a node or b) to their own
node address.
3.2 Finding Z-Wave nodes in range
The Find Nodes In Range command is used by the Gateway
in the inclusion phase of a new devices. The device, which
is being included into the Z-Wave network, will send NOP
Power packages to every address given in the command. Af-
terwards the device waits a moment after each packet sent
to get an ACK message. Using this method the requesting
device is able to discover all other devices within its range
(see figure 2). If the command is completed the device sends
a Command Complete package to notify that it has finished.
The command Find Nodes In Range will generally be send by
the gateway to an device which is getting included. Devices,
which aren’t in the inclusion phase, should not accept this
command.
Fig. 2. Procedure of Find Nodes in Range command [16]
4 METHODOLOGY
In general Python scripts have been used to create and
process packets with Scapy-Radio. The Scapy-Radio version
of BastilleResearch [9] was used for our purpose. These
Packages are then processed through software defined ra-
dio with GNU Radio. Therefore the open-source Software
Defined Radio HackRF One [7] was used as an transmitter
and receiver. Two of them were needed, because they aren’t
full-duplex. We had to change the GNU Radio flow graph
to get at least the receiving path of 100 Kbit/s and 40 Kbit/s
running. With the used flow graph we were able to send
packages with 40 Kbit/s.
4.1 Used tools: Scapy-Radio
Scapy-Radio, a modified version of the python program
Scapy [17], which has been altered to process wireless pro-
tocols, is used to send, sniff and filter the Z-Wave packages.
3The specific version used has been modified by BastilleRe-
search [9] as testing tool for IoT radio networks and includes
some Z-Wave protocol capabilities.
4.2 Used tools: Gnu-Radio
GNU Radio [8] is a free tool for implementing software
defined radios (SDR). GNU Radio uses two HackRF One
in this project, one as receiver and one as transmitter. GNU
Radio has a graphical user interface which can be used to
create a or multiple flow graphs from blocks via drag and
drop (much like Matlab Simulink). For the HackRF One
a Osmocom [18] source block is used. The created flow
graph defines the decoding, demodulation and the general
processing of the signals. The used flowgraph is shown in 3.
At the end of the flowgraph the data stream is send via the
system’s internal loopback interface to the written Python
script for further processing.
4.3 Used tools: HackRF One
The HackRF One [7] is an open-source SDR solution. This
device can transmit and receive radio signals from one
megahertz to six gigahertz. It can be connected via USB and
be used for instance in GNU Radio or be programmed as a
stand-alone solution.
4.4 Packet Manipulation
In search for vulnerabilities within the Z-Wave protocol
or specific implementations malicious data packages were
generated using Scapy-Radio. Primarily, unencrypted com-
mands were tested as these can be used independently from
the encryption and security level, which were manipulated
in different ways. First the addresses were changed and
combinations were tested which include single- and mul-
ticast traffic. After these tests the payload was also altered,
especially the packets with the requirement of the receiver
to send a answer. During these tests the commands Nonce
Get / S2 Nonce Get and Find Nodes In Range were showing
unexpected effects. Through these effects both commands
could be used for a Denial of Service attack against the Z-
Wave gateway.
4.5 Nonce-Get manipulation
The only manipulation needed for the Nonce Get frames
is to change the source and destination addresses like in
figure 4 or 5. These are both changed to decimal 001. This
is the address of the gateway itself. With the S2 Nonce Get
frames the sequence number is counted up as well. Now
the gateway seems to send itself Nonce Get commands.
Naturally the HomeID of the Z-Wave network has to be
changed to the ID of the attacked one.
As long as the attacker is sending these manipulated
packets, the gateway tries to send Nonce Report packets
to itself . This is not a problem in itself. Should there now
be a node in the network available, which is capable of
routing, it tries to route the Nonce Report packets via other
routing nodes back to the gateway (see figure 6), which
doesn’t recognize itself being the destination of the packet
and tries the routing process several times over again. This
process takes a lot longer now, which in the meantime stops
the gateway from processing received packets or commands
sent via the smartphone app. As the gateway is the central
managing entity within the network, which is responsible
for both the logic and control of the connected nodes (i.e. the
user’s defined home automation programming), the whole
Z-Wave network is blocked for as long as the gateway
is blocked itself. Depending on the specific gateway and
its implementation it might also be possible to use a not
existing source address to get the gateway into the same
state. During testing one such gateway was encountered
among the test candidates (see figure 7).
4.6 Routed Nonce(nse)
Through the previously mentioned effects a Denial of Ser-
vice (DoS) attack is created if the attacker keeps on sending
manipulated Nonce Get frames, as the network is constantly
routing nonsense. Because this Denial of Service blocks the
gateway, device internal automation aren’t affected, like
disassembly alarms. It is beneficial that the messages are
sent unencrypted, which enables this attack for both security
level S0 and S2. The efficiency of the attack varies though,
depending on the specific manufacturer of the gateway.
The most efficient result was a twenty minute DoS logjam
against the targeted gateway utilizing only 256 sent packets.
4.7 Automated Routed Noncense
To automate this attack, a Python script was written to read
the HomeID of the target network in reach, creating the ma-
nipulated messages automatically. Such created messages
are then sent continuously to the targeted network. The
intervals in which the packets are sent vary depending on
the manufacturer of the gateway. If S2 Nonce Get packets
are sent, a counter is used for the sequence number.
4.8 Manipulating ”Find nodes in range”
The second DoS attack is realized through misuse of the
Find Nodes In Range command. Here, the addresses of the
packet are changed again. Both source and destination ad-
dresses are set to decimal 001. Afterwards the payload is
changed, filling it with 32 bytes of 0xFF (see figure 8). The
payload usually depends on the known nodes in the net-
work(assumed through testing). Because of this alteration,
the gateway seems to send itself a Find Nodes In Range
packet. The HomeID of the attacked network has to be
inserted as well. It works with both security level S0 and
S2 without security level specific changes.
4.9 Severity of the manipulation
Should this manipulated packet now been sent, the gateway
gets the command to look for nodes in range. Therefore it
sends NOP Power packets to all possible addresses going
several times through every address. It’s waiting after each
sent packet a fracture of time for an ACK and proceeds
then with sending a packet to the next address. While
the gateway executes this command, it doesn’t answer or
process any incoming messages as depicted in figure 9 the
Nonce Get package or commands from the smartphone app.
4Fig. 3. Z-Wave Flow Graph
Fig. 4. Structure of manipulated S0 Nonce Get packet
Fig. 5. Structure of manipulated S2 Nonce Get packet
Fig. 6. Nonce Get S0 Packet reaction
Therefore this can be used for an DoS attack as well. The
execution of the manipulated packet takes the gateway a
little under two minutes. The duration of the jamming is
consistent through all manufacturers. With these effects of
a manipulated Find Nodes In Range packet, a opportunity
for a very efficient DoS attack is given. Since the gateway
Fig. 7. Nonce Get S2 packet reaction
Fig. 8. Find Nodes In Range manipulated
executes no other commands during the two minute time
frame, the consecutively sent messages need to have perfect
timing to guarantee a continuous Denial of Service on the
gateway. Some old versions of the Z-Wave protocol can
cause the gateway to send Command Complete packets after
the execution, which gives the attacker the exact moment
to send another manipulated packet. This was the case
with one of the tested gateways. The latest version of the
Z-Wave protocol doesn’t cause the gateway to send the
Command Complete packet. This version is obligatory for
all manufacturers which require a S2 certification for their
devices.
5Fig. 9. Finde Nodes In Range Serverity
4.10 Automated ”Power of NOP(e)”
The first part of the automation is the automatic insertion
of the HomeID of the attacked network, which can be read-
out of any normal packet sent within the Z-Wave network.
The second part is the continuous sending of the Find
Nodes In Range packets in given time intervals to jam the
gateway and therefore the entire Z-Wave network. With the
old implementations of the protocol there is the possibility
to wait for an Command Complete packet to determine the
perfect moment for the attacker to send the next packet.
5 RESULTS
There are two main differences between the tested smart
home gateways. The first difference is the efficiency of
the Routed Noncense attack. It probably has performance
reasons how fast the gateway executes the routing measure-
ments. The second difference is the used version of the Z-
Wave protocol.
There are still device for sale which implement older
protocol releases from Silicon labs supporting only S0. These
differ from the newer ones which support S2 as well. There-
fore a gateway which had an older version only supporting
S0 was easier to exploit by sending a fake Find Nodes
In Range packet, because it returned a Command Complete
packet after finishing the command. The newer versions of
Z-Wave supporting S2 don’t send this packet which makes
it slightly harder to exploit. This can be used for perfect
timing of the transmission of the next Find Nodes In Range
packets in an ongoing attack. The jamming of a Z-Wave
network can be useful for an intruder, who’s goal is to break
into a Z-Wave secured house without e.g. raising the alarm.
In such attack scenario, the new found DoS attacks can
be used instead of a normal hardware frequency jammer,
which the difference that a jamming attack usually also
effects neighbouring systems unintentionally. This attack
can also be remote controlled if the attacker places a suitable
SDR in a waterproof case powered by a battery pack and
connected via GPRS or similar mobile protocols. The DoS
attacks can still be detected via heartbeat detection to an
extend. If the heartbeat detection is executed by the gateway
only, it maybe wouldn’t be executed, similar to the com-
mands coming from the smartphone application. Therefore
it would have to detect that itself isn’t sending heartbeats.
On the other side a connected device would be able to
detect a inactive gateway through heartbeats and would
have to display the lost connection somehow. This would
be difficult with window contacts or other devices which
don’t have a proper way to display these lost connections
with other than a blinking LED, but not with alarm sirens
or other security related devices which offer proper visual
and audible feedback. As example the siren could activate a
sound alarm. The user would have to be able to deactivate
the heartbeat alarm in case there is a need to shut down the
gateway or in the case of a downtime because of an update.
6 DISCUSSION
In general this security issues were caused by mistakes of
programmers during the implementation of the protocol.
The Find Nodes In Range command as example is not de-
signed to be executed by the gateway. It is only supposed to
be executed by other nodes during inclusion. The gateway
is missing a rule to not send Nonce Report packets to non-
existent addresses or itself as well. This shows how impor-
tant prerequisites are, under which even less important or
less used commands are allowed to be executed.
7 CONCLUSION
Z-Wave is a radio protocol. Therefore it is always possible
to execute a DoS attack with the use of a jammer. With this
in mind the found DoS attacks are less severe, but it’s a
more concealed way of a DoS attack which isn’t detectable
though jamming detection using a Received Signal Strength
Indicator. Besides that, it’s a very efficient way to block
the Z-Wave network. The main problem which was used
for the attacks is the whole logic of the Z-Wave network
being taken over by the gateway. Created automation, push
messages and the processing of commands from the smart-
phone app are tasks of the gateway only. Because of that,
the Z-Wave network has a star topology with some mesh
capabilities when it comes to routing. So there is no need
to block all nodes in the Z-Wave network if there is a
way to block the central node. As an example the alarm
siren wouldn’t go off when the window contact senses the
opening of the window, since the gateway wouldn’t execute
the automation for it. Both attacks take advantage of this by
only blocking the gateway and therefore jamming the whole
network. The attacks are both much more efficient than
normal jamming and simple to pull off. The attack Power
of NOPe requires the attacker to send one Find Nodes In
Range packet approx. every two minutes. The most efficient
case of the Routed Noncense attack was able to block the
gateway with just 256 packets for ca. 20 minutes. Both
attacks can be repeated to block the gateway constantly over
a intended time frame. Both attacks are only traceable if the
attacked person has a Z-Wave sniffer active at all times.
Then the person has to determine the unusual messages
and would need to check if these were possible within Z-
Wave. The source of the attack can’t be determined, because
6the messages look like they’ve been sent from the gateway.
A jammer would be much easier to be detected, because
it blocks communication in itself. There are no permanent
effects after the attacks and the gateway goes back to normal
operation after the end of the attacks. Our written tool and
the modified Scapy-Radio parts can be found in our GitHub
repository: https://github.com/A-Siemer/Dirtywave
8 UPDATES
Silicon Labs acknowledged the vulnerabilities discovered in
this paper and has already informed their customers via
public announcement [19]. Along with the announcement
an updated Z-Wave implementation and protocol specifi-
cation was made available, fixing the vulnerabilities which
lead to the attack described above. The updated version
of the Z-Wave protocol can be downloaded from the com-
pany’s website [20].
9 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We would like to thank Silicon Labs for their cooperation
during the evaluation of the Z-Wave vulnerability found,
especially Jakob Buron. This project received funding from
the Institute for Project Oriented Teaching (IPro-L) - Univer-
sity of Applied Sciences Emden/Leer.
REFERENCES
[1] Statista, “Smart Home Report 2019.” https://de.statista.com/
statistik/studie/id/41155/dokument/smart-home-report/, 2019.
[2] S. G. Behrang Fouladi, “Honey, im home!! - hacking z-wave home
automation systems.” Presentation at Black Hat-USA 2013, Las
Vegas, NV, USA, July 27Aug. 1, 2013.
[3] SiliconLabs, “EFR32ZG14 Z-Wave 700 Modem SoC DataSheet.”
https://www.silabs.com/documents/public/data-sheets/
efr32zg14-datasheet.pdf, 01 2019.
[4] SiliconLabs, “ZGM130S Z-Wave 700 SiP Module DataSheet.”
https://www.silabs.com/documents/public/data-sheets/
zgm130s-datasheet.pdf, 10 2019.
[5] O. Z-Wave, “Open z-wave website.” http://www.openzwave.
com/.
[6] Z.-W. Alliance, “2018 end of year z-wave ecosystem report.”
https://z-wavealliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/
Z-Wave-Alliance-End-of-Year-Report-FINAL-for-web.pdf.
[7] Great Scott Gadgets, “HackRF One - SDR multi-frequency
sender/receiver.” https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/. Ac-
cessed: 2019-11-20.
[8] T. G. R. Foundation, “GNU Radio - tool for visual modelling soft-
ware defined radio applications.” https://www.gnuradio.org/.
Accessed: 2019-11-20.
[9] Bastille Research, “Scapy Radio Toolkit for Python.” https://
github.com/BastilleResearch/scapy-radio. Accessed: 2019-11-20.
[10] PenTestPartners, “Z-Shave. Exploiting Z-Wave downgrade
attacks.” https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/
z-shave-exploiting-z-wave-downgrade-attacks/. Accessed:
2019-11-20.
[11] B. Fouladi and S. Ghanoun, “Security evaluation of the z-
wave wireless protocol.” https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/10e1/
21b903366ea81b94ca0c2e61c095cc087695.pdf, 2013. Blackhat Con-
ference, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA.
[12] C. W. Badenhop, S. R. Graham, B. W. Ramsey, B. E. Mullins, and
L. O. Mailloux, “The z-wave routing protocol and its security
implications,” Computers & Security, vol. 68, pp. 112 – 129, 2017.
[13] SiliconLabs, “Z-Wave Specification.” https://www.silabs.com/
products/wireless/mesh-networking/z-wave/specification. Ac-
cessed: 2019-11-20.
[14] SiliconLabs, “SDS10865 - Z-Wave Application Security Layer (S0).”
https://www.silabs.com/documents/login/reference-manuals/
SDS10865-Z-Wave-Application-Security-Layer-S0.pdf, 03 2018.
[15] SiliconLabs, “SDS13783 - Z-Wave Transport-
Encapsulation Command Class Specification.” https:
//www.silabs.com/documents/login/miscellaneous/
SDS13783-Z-Wave-Transport-Encapsulation-Command-Class-Specification.
pdf, 10 2019.
[16] SiliconLabs, “CTS10999 - Z-Wave Certification Test Specification.”
https://www.silabs.com/documents/login/miscellaneous/
CTS10999-Z-Wave-Certification-Test-Specification.pdf, 03 2018.
[17] P. L. G. P. Philippe Biondi, Guillaume Valadon, “Scapy - Python
swiss army toolkit for packet manipulation.” https://scapy.net/.
Accessed: 2019-11-20.
[18] Osmocom, “OsmocomSDR.” https://osmocom.org/projects/
gr-osmosdr/wiki/GrOsmoSDR. Accessed: 2019-11-20.
[19] SiliconLabs, “PSIRT-27 - Zwave Control Message DoS attack
on Gateways and End-nodes.” internal customer security advi-
sory/announcement, unpublished.
[20] SiliconLabs, “Z-Wave SDK.” https://www.silabs.com/products/
development-tools/software/z-wave/embedded-sdk. Accessed:
2019-11-20.
